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INTRODUCTION 
(and ABSTRACT) 
The entire weight of Locke 1 s philosophy of mind hangs on a 
theory of representation. What is at issue here is not just the 
representative theory of perception, w~th all its familiar problems. 
The failure of Locke's theory of knowledge to do the job it is supposed 
to do can be traced back to an inadequate account of what it is for the 
mind to grasp the reference, or the sense of a sign, i.e. to represent 
something. It is all the more strange, therefore, that Locke never 
discusses the question of what it is for something to represent something 
else. Although the Essay presupposes an implicit theory of represent-
ation over and over again, that theory is never made explicit. 
But this remarkable omission is not confined to Locke. A 
concept of representation has played a part in almost all the classic 
theories of knowledge, for example, in Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, 
Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Husserl etc. In Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus we come much closer to an articulated account of represent-
ation in the 'picture' theory of propositions and states of affairs. 
But nowhere in these classic accounts do we find any explicit articulation 
of a theory of representation as such. 
In more recent times there has been some opening up of the 
topic of representation as, for example, in Foucault's account of 
representation and signification in different 'epistemes' (Foucault, 
1970); and in a recent colloquium on representation (Freed, Marras, 
Maynard, 1975). But discussion of representation are usually concerned 
with a particular form, e.g. political representation (Pitkin, 1967 and 
1969), or representation in art (Scruton, 1974, chapter 13), rather than 
with the general question of what it is to use one item to represent 
another. There are, however, two areas of discussion which have raised 
some general questions about representation. One is semiotic theory, 
which deals with the topic of signification, and this as we shall see 
is closely related to representation; the other is cognitive psychology, 
in particular Piaget's account of thinking. For this reason a detailed 
examination of these two areas occupies a large part of what follows, 
even though they may not normally be regarded as areas of central 
interest in philosophy. 
viLi 
Perh:lpS the gell<'X<Il lnck or engngc'ment w.i.til the topJc of 
representation as such, especially by philosophers who have been 
preoccupied by the theory of knowledge and who might therefore be 
expected to face squarely the question of what it is for one thing to 
represent another, can be explained by the fact that the general concept 
is thought to be intuitively clear and does not need explanation. Thus, 
it might perhaps be thought that though there are special problems about 
particular kinds of representation, e.g. political representation or 
representation in art, and perhaps even more in the question of how it 
is that language manages to represent the world, these arise out of the 
special nature of the particular subject matter rather than from general 
difficulties about the relation of representation itself. In fact, 
however, these special problems which arise in special contexts - e.g. 
as questions about meaning and truth conditions in the philosophy of 
language - are often simply special aspects of a general problem about 
the nature of representation as such. For in the very basic conception 
of representation, as making one thing stand for another, all is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. 
As we shall see in our study of Locke, it is precisely because 
representation seems to be so unproblematic, but is not, that problems 
arise unnoticed by Locke. These problems arise out of apparently 
uncontroversial situations which we may take for granted at a common-
sense level. A photograph resembles its subject, but is it true to say 
that resemblance is a 'natural' relation which creates a link of repres-
entation? Does an icon simply point to some other item, in virtue of 
its resemblance? Peirce and others have thought so - mistakenly, as 
we shall see. Can non-language-using animals represent things, or 
understand representations? We might have good reason for thinking so. 
After all, cats and dogs respond to the rattle of plates (nowadays even 
to the sound of an electric can opener) as a sign of forthcoming food; 
we talk about 'sentinel' cockatoos which give 'warning' cries of 'danger'. 
In this sense, then, our intuitions, expressed in our ordinary language, 
are that animals do use representation. But there are differences. 
Dumb animals do not (as far as we know) intend to represent, and this 
fact has an important bearing on our understanding of representation. 
Are mental images representations? We almost always talk about them as 
if they were. For example, "I have an image of the circular window in 
Chartres Cathedral, but I'm not sure if I have all the right colours in 
it". Does this mean, then, that images are mental pictures which 
i:x 
rc::-;emble Lhelr orJgiualH, though imperfeet]y? Jlow does the jmnge eome 
to represent the external item, how do I know what it represents? 
These are some of the questions that we shall have to consider 
in the course of developing an account of the nature of representation. 
That is the major task of the first two parts of this thesis. In Parts 
I and II I shall develop an account which has as its central claim that 
representation is a three-term relation between representative item, 
represented item and some agent or individual who makes or understands 
the representat"ional relation. The unpacking of this representation 
relation is another important question. No adequate account of the 
relation can be derived from a passive theory of mind (such as Locke's); 
active thought is essential to the establishment of the representational 
relation. Representation, as we shall see, is an intentional act - that 
is to say, an act of thought directed towards some object(s). 
With a provisional account of representation worked out in 
the first two Parts, we shall turn in Part III to some of the broader 
implications of this account. What, for example, is the relationship 
between representation and thought, and between representation and reality? 
Piaget has claimed that representation is identical with (conceptual) 
thought. My claim is the more limited one that all conceptual thought 
involves an act of representation. The capacity for representation is, 
in fact, an important differentia between human thought and the thought 
of other animals. Representation gives us the means to summon up in 
thought what is spatia-temporally absent or non-existent. We may be 
tempted to think of the content of this thought (about some absent item) 
as detachable from the act of thought itself. Having done this, it is 
easy to succumb to the further temptation to think of this 'detached 
content' as some inner mental entity. When we analyse representational 
thought correctly, however, we shall see that it is an act of thought 
having as its ultimate object or reference some item of reality. 
This, then, is a major theme of the thesis: that no signifier 
yields information by itself; it must be referred by some agent to 
some feature or features of the real world. But the dependence between 
representation and reality goes both ways. Our notion of 'reality' is 
in turn dependent on our capacity for representation. This is not the 
idealist thesis that the objects of the world have no existence outside 
the perceiving mind, but rather the phenomenological thesis that in 
apprehending what we think of as 'things in themselves' we bring to this 
X 
npprf'IH'IIHinn n nynl·hpn[R or othC'r PXpPrfC'Il<'('H, know]eclp,(', hc1iPfR etc. 
Representation is required for this synthesis. We grasp 'reality' 
through a network of concepts and past experiences. Were it not for 
the application of representation in this form to reality, not only 
could it not be recognised as reality, we should have no cognitive grasp 
of it ~t nll. We r>houlcl he in the same position as non-human animals 
which only respond to present items by means of simple stimulus-response 
mechanisms. 
ABSTRACT 
Part I raises the problems that will shape our investigation 
of representation. Locke's account is inadequate because of its failure 
to allow any role to an agent who creates or understands the represent-
ational relation. Representation occurs mysteriously by means of 
mediating entities. This inadequacy becomes even more evident in 
contrast with Aquinas' account of the activity of mind: representation 
for Aquinas is an act (not an object) of mind. A reading of Aquinas 
also illuminates the reasons for the extreme passivity of Locke's 
account, since itsorigins are clearly to be seen in the Thomist account, 
but Locke's version has lost the most important feature of the Thomist 
account. Descartes' conception of 'ideas' is ambivalent between act 
and object; and, in examining some of the problems of his account, we 
shall see the importance of an intentional interpretation of represent-
ation: that it is an act of thought about some object. 
Part II develops the issues raised earlier within the 
particular context of signification and semiotic theory. The semiotic 
theories of Saussure, Peirce .and Piaget are examined, with occasional 
reference to Frege. The theme of Chapters 4 to 6 is that a signifier 
is only as good as the intelligence which uses it. It is not because 
humans have a sign system that they can achieve 'disengagement' from 
any particular 'here-and--n~w' context: other animals also use repres-
entative items, but not in the same way as humans do. Something more 
is required than just the availability of some physical item which 
can stand in for something else. There are various kinds of signifiers -
broadly speaking, those which are used wittingly and those which are 
unwittingly used - and what gives a signifier its particular structure 
is the manner of its use. Part II, then, deals with questions about 
xl 
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But this investigation reveals the importance of the representative act, 
and it is to this topic that we turn in the final Part. 
Part III focuses on the activity of representation. What kind 
of act is it, and how is it possible? In Chapter 7 a distinction is 
made between active and passive senses of representation, and arising 
out of this distinction we study the particular case of images, 
considered as a form of representation. Chapter 8 presents a contrast 
between non-representational (animal) thought and representational 
thought, and this leads to a final discussion of the relationship 
between representation, thought and reality. 
